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Merging Tibetan Culture into the
Chinese Economic Fast Lane
The Great Western Development policy should increase immigration
from inner China to the Tibet Autonomous Region
Susette Cooke
1 The  nature  of  Tibet's  historical  situation  relative  to  China  1,  and  its  current
manifestation as the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) within the People's Republic of
China  (PRC),  has  generated  specific  administration  policies  from  the  central
government since the 1950s2. With the adoption in 2000 of a new national strategy for
developing its western regions, China plans a “completely new look” for these areas3,
not least the TAR, where effects of the Great Western Development (GWD) policy (Xibu
da kaifa) are likely to be more profound than for any other provincial-level constituent
of the PRC. While the central government has included the TAR as just one of multiple
provincial-level components of its new strategy, it has also refocused its specific Tibet
policy  in  tandem  with  the  national  project,  a  recognition  of  the  TAR's  distinctive
characteristics and problems. Among the PRC's five autonomous regions, all of which
are  included  in  the  GWD,  the  TAR's  cultural  and  ethnic  characteristics  are  more
homogeneous  than  in  any  of  the  others:  a  single  non-Han  culture  and  nationality
dominates the region,  who have a  clear,  commonly-shared self-identity.  Ethnic  and
cultural diversity characterises many of the other areas under the GWD, but before
1950, when the Han Chinese began to arrive in Tibet, one term could sum up everything
that was there as Tibetan.
2 For this reason, an account of the GWD's likely impact in Tibet, and local responses to
it, are more cogently considered in a cultural perspective than measured economically.
At its core, the GWD intends to remould the western areas through a new approach to
socialist nationality relations, economic development, and insistence on national unity.
Its architects aim for a “profound social transformation”4, intending that few aspects of
life will be shielded from its effect. Tibetans see the framing of their future in such
terms as certain to result in cultural dilution and marginalisation5. At 2.62 million in
2000, the TAR population forms only 0.7% of the total population within the GWD area,
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and a mere 0.2% of the population in the whole of the PRC. The policy's commitment to
national  unity  and  integration  over  the  maintenance  of  distinctiveness,  realised
through the vector of economic development, has the potential to realise changes of
breathtaking scope and magnitude.
3 China's Tibet policy has evolved since the 1950s, but a national strategic dimension has
remained at the core. In the TAR, implementation of the GWD is above all a political
matter,  imposed from the  top  down,  designed for  state  interests.  Ultimately  China
hopes  to  solve  what  it  terms “the nationalities  problem” in  Tibet  and the  western
regions  through  application  of  the  GWD  policy,  “the  necessary  choice”  for  the
situation6.  Tibet  has  been a  final  frontier  for  the  Chinese  nation-state,  where  local
elements have contested Chinese political authority, as well as assimilation on other
fronts,  since  the  1950's.  Now  China's  leadership  envisages  a  conclusive  long-term
strategy7, whereby the TAR and its population will finally be integrated seamlessly into
the Chinese nation. 
4 The potential local impact of the GWD is contested. On the Chinese government side is
the official representation of the past, the current situation, and the future that should
be constructed.  On the other  side  is  the  unauthorised impression:  the  view on the
ground for Tibetans of the past, the current situation and the expected future, a view
kept  largely  private  for  fear  of  punishment.  This  paper  will  briefly  consider
perspectives from both sides of the contest, and suggest potential consequences of the
new policy for Tibet's, and China's, future. 
Historical perspective: contested identities
5 At the basis of the Sino-Tibetan contestation is the political status of Tibet in history.
The intractable nature of this conflict shadows Chinese policy in the TAR and local
reaction to it, no matter what the issue or the time frame. China's claim that Tibet is,
and has  long been,  part  of  the Chinese motherland permeates  official  rhetoric  and
indeed  virtually  all  Tibet-related  unofficial  publications  in  the  PRC.  In  contrast  to
provincial units where political loyalties are not in doubt, official statements on GWD
implementation  in  the  TAR  invariably  refer  to  the  historical  dimension  of  Tibetan
relations with China. By emphasising national security and stability as basic goals in
GWD policy for Tibet, China acknowledges the fundamental issues at stake.
6 The  CCP  shares  its  ideological  position  on  Tibet's  inalienability  from  the  Chinese
nation-state  with  Chinese  leaders  since  Republican  times,  when  the  Tibetan
Government  in  Lhasa  regarded  Tibet  as  an  independent  polity.  In  1950  the  CCP
enforced  its  view  of  Tibet's  subordinate  status  with  military  invasion  in  the  first
instance,  followed  by  dismantling  of  the  existing  political  and  social  order  and
insertion of the same mechanisms for societal transformation being implemented in
the rest of the PRC. Nominal autonomous status granted to Tibet did not, in practice,
shield the region from all-encompassing re-ordering.
7 Today the state conceives its mission in implementing the GWD not just as historic, but
as part of a historical process: the continuity of China's absorption [assimilation] of the
western regions, and the restructuring of their demographic, cultural and economic
characteristics: “Historically, large‑scale western development is a major undertaking
in China's development and will have a major impact on China's economic, political,
and cultural  life as well  as a profound influence on ethnic relations of the western
regions”8.
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8 Contemporary  PRC  historiography  of  the  western  regions  generally  supports  the
concept of the gradual evolution of these areas into integral components of the Chinese
nation, a process whereby they become “Chinese” in a political and a cultural sense.
The GWD now aims to strengthen the alignment of the Chinese nation-state on multiple
levels, at times using such terms as “coagulability” and “centripetal” to describe the
forces involved9.  These explanations justify the lack of  need for special  concessions
within the GWD in areas like the TAR where history, culture, dominant ethnicity and
China's designation as “autonomous” might logically suggest alternative policies. But
as explained by a prominent Tibetan official, Ragdi, autonomy means “the fundamental
political system by which our country resolves ethnic problems” (emphasis added)10,  a
formula highlighting an inherent GWD objective. 
9 Tibetans  who  construe  the  past  differently  from  the  official  line  risk  criminal
prosecution, since any challenge to the unity of the motherland or the nationalities is
unconstitutional and illegal. In responding to the GWD they see a fundamental conflict
between the goal of strengthened integration and their own historical discourse, but
their facility to express divergent views is vigorously repressed by the state's politico-
legal apparatus. 
10 Chinese leaders characterise the GWD as a national project expected to make its mark
on history,  and assert  the historical  and political  legitimacy of  their  mission.  Their
awareness that Tibetan opposition exists and is an expected cause of friction has been
built into the goals and methodology of the GWD project. The TAR 10th Five-Year Plan,
for example, admits “the intensity and complexity of the struggle with separatism”,
calling it “a daunting challenge” which must be “tackled”11: Chapter 19—“Conducting
the Anti‑Separatism Struggle in Depth, Safeguarding Social and Political Stability”—is
devoted to the matter. Whether Tibetans accept the Chinese historical discourse or not,
the  GWD  aims  to  achieve  a  solution  to  the  “nationalities  problem”  anyway.  The
development's invocation of state-endorsed history throws up an inescapable element
of conflict at the local level in the TAR. The project addresses this in the strongest
terms  by  integrating  legal,  political  and  socio-economic  counteractions  into  its
provisions.
Policy and political aims 
11 In June 2001, the Party's top leadership convened the Fourth Forum on Work in Tibet,
an  occasionally-held  event  signifying  the  Party's  intention  to  reinforce  its  policy
concerning  this  distinctive  component  of  PRC  territory12.  The  Work  Forum's
significance lay less in the details of policy statements than in the context framing
them:  the  primacy  of  national  unity  and  development,  the  key  role  of  the  newly-
adopted GWD policy in this goal, and the TAR's constituency within the GWD13.
12 Other policy conventions dovetailed with the Tibet Work Forum, consolidating both the
TAR's  position  within  national  policy  and the  reach of  Peking's  plans  into  Tibetan
affairs. Following the announcement of a new national development policy for the so-
called “Western Region of China” in January 2000 and adoption of the Tenth Five-Year
Plan in March 2001, the TAR's place in the new national strategy was laid out during
2001 in the TAR Government's Tenth Five-Year Plan (in early June), then the Fourth
Forum on Work in Tibet (June 25th-27th), and finally during the celebrations in Lhasa
for the 50th Anniversary of the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet in July14.
13 All official statements released from these events stress the TAR's integral importance
in national strategy. Party General-Secretary Jiang Zemin declared at the Fourth Work
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Forum that development and long-term stability are the two major issues for work in
Tibet,  and that  these  in  turn are  “related to  the strategic  implementation of  great
western expansion, to national unity and social stability, to the unification and security
of the motherland, and to our national image and international struggle… Safeguarding
stability  and  development  in  Tibet  as  well  as  the  unification  and  security  of  the
motherland is an important political  task of Tibet work”15.  Such an openly political
construct  of  the  TAR's  role  in  national  security,  through  GWD  formulation,
distinguishes  this  region  from  those  in  the  project16,  both  from  the  central
government's  viewpoint  and  in  terms  of  local  response.  Yet  the  emphasis  on  the
political dimension of development in Tibet is hardly a departure from preceding Party
policy for the TAR: the Third Tibet Work Forum (July 1994) framed the Party-state role
in equivalent terms: “The work in Tibet occupies a strategic position in the general task
of the party and the state ... To accelerate Tibet's development is not only an economic
issue of eliminating the gap between regional development but is also a political issue
having an overall strategic interest”17. Under the GWD, policies and processes already
in place for the TAR will be intensified rather than reconfigured.
14 In June 2000 Li Dezhu established the direct and unequivocal interdependence between
carrying out the GWD as the correct means of  developing the west,  and protecting
national unity as an essential element of succeeding with the project: “Only by carrying
out the strategy of large‑scale western development and accelerating development of
ethnic regions will a solid foundation for strengthening national unity and protecting
social  stability  be  laid.  Only  by  strengthening  national  unity  and  protecting  social
stability  will  a  favourable  social  environment  for  carrying  out  the  strategy  of
large‑scale western development be created”18.
15 Hu Jintao contextualised this equation for the TAR a year later: “Tibet is in the south-
western frontier of the motherland, with a vast stretch of land and a most important
strategic  position.  The  development,  stability  and  security  of  Tibet  have  a  direct
bearing on the fundamental interests of people of all ethnic groups in Tibet as well as
ethnic solidarity, national unity and state security… Rapid economic development is
the fundamental condition for realising the interests of all ethnic groups in Tibet and
also the basic guarantee for greater ethnic unity and continued stability there”19.
16 For David Goodman, nation-building is an integral discourse of the project20. In Tibet,
populated by a non-Han majority who have consistently shown themselves resistant to
cultural  and  political  integration  with  Chinese  norms,  the  nation-building  aspect
underpins  virtually  all  levels  of  GWD  planning.  Its  colonialist  traits,  implicit  in  its
developmental measures and the official rhetorical terminology of national unification,
characterise  centre-TAR  interactions  concerning  implementation  and  goals  of  the
GWD. Colonialist activities by China in areas of predominantly Tibetan settlement pre-
date the PRC, let alone the GWD, but exploitative and demographic colonialism in Tibet
does  begin  in  the  1950s.  The  experienced realities  of  the  relationship  between the
contemporary TAR area and China are not precisely paralleled by the imperial agenda
of Qing times, which was essentially a politically expedient diplomatic arrangement,
engineered to secure the then Tibetan polity as a buffer against Mongol, then Anglo-
Russian threats to inner China. Now—and in a process intentionally accelerated under
the  GWD—China’s  agenda  for  the  TAR  involves  multi-level  integrationist,
assimilationist and Hanificationist measures.  The effects of similar strategies by the
current  and  Republican  Chinese  states  may  be  observed  in  Manchuria  and  Inner
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Mongolia, where deep demographic, economic and cultural transformations have taken
place since approximately  the turn of  the twentieth century.  The PRC’s  concept  of
“autonomy” does not  clash with the aims of  the process.  Chinese official  discourse
privileges national unity over considerations of ethnic distinctiveness, and especially in
current terms emphasises the historical inevitability of its various minzu evolving into
the family of the Chinese motherland21.
17 For  the  TAR,  the  economic  development  component  of  the  campaign,  however
seriously it will  be promoted, has a strategic base: national stability through firmer
integration of the TAR will enhance China's regional stability, which in turn will foster
economic development and even foreign investment.
Cultural impact: demographics
18 The overwhelming majority ethnicity in the TAR is Tibetan, and that Tibetan ethnic
culture contains significant features distinguishing it  from that of the national Han
majority. Assessments of Tibetan culture in reference to the GWD are presented as a
couplet: recognition of difference, and the need for change. In an argument applied to
the whole western region by Li Dezhu in 2000 and underscored for the TAR by Jiang
Zemin at  the  2001 Fourth Tibet  Work Forum,  culture  will  be  made to  fit  the  GWD
framework of  national  security  and economic development by means of  the “new”
socialist nationalities relations, which will promote social stability and national—and
nationality—“coagulability”22.  To achieve this,  the Party leadership advocates a dual
process  of  specifically-targeted,  applied  cultural  policy  measures  and  demographic
changes  resulting  from overall  policy.  The  most  psychologically-charged dimension
where the GWD may be expected to impact locally, therefore, is culture. 
19 Since the arrival of the PLA in Lhasa in 1951, the Party has adopted a series of cultural
polices, ranging from near-destruction to relative liberalism. Each aimed to transform
Tibetan culture along Chinese state guidelines. Consistent with this trend, GWD policy
asserts  unequivocally  that  Tibetan  culture  must  adapt  to  the  new  conditions  and
requirements  of  the  GWD.  Like  former  TAR  leaders,  the  current  provincial
administration  must  take  central  directives  as  the  basis  for  dealing  with  locally-
relevant cultural matters and engage in developmental objectives, including cultural
ones23.  There is no question of the development paradigm adapting to local culture:
Tibetan  culture  is  a  problem  to  be  overcome,  not  a  feature  to  be  protected  and
nourished. Following high-level assertions of cultural impediments among the western
regions' minority populations, it is often left to regional authorities to indict backward
cultural characteristics standing in the way of successful realisation of the state's socio-
economic policy24. From Jiang Zemin's ideology of “socialist spiritual civilisation”25 to
explanations  of  Tibet's  unsuitable  ideological  concepts  from  the  TAR  government
chairman, Legqog26,  cultural discourse for the TAR is moulded by the state's call for
social stability, national unity and economic development.
20 Described as the sharing of cultures under the new socialist ethnic relations, cultural
integration guarantees the spread of Chinese norms and values, which will assist GWD
goals.  Among other  things  the  GWD project  is  about  national  minority  populations
becoming  culturally  more  like  the  Han  Chinese,  attaining  “culture  with  Chinese
characteristics”27.  Party  policy  leaves  no  doubt  that  cultural  assimilation  into  the
Chinese mainstream is a desirable outcome for Tibetans themselves.
21 Tibetans have lamented before that  their  cultural  institutions,  practices  and values
were under threat, but one pillar of the GWD heightens their concerns more than any
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other:  the  certainty  of  increased  immigration  from  inner  China.  The  anticipated
population shift from east to west, poetically encapsulated as “the phenomenon of the
peacock flying west” by Li Dezhu28,  or more prosaically flagged as “encourag[ing] ...
proper  inter-regional  population  circulation”  by  the  State  Council29,  is  considered
elemental to the success of the GWD30. In the TAR, with its historically homogeneous
Tibetan population, substantial immigration will transform regional demographics. 
22 Official  statistics  do not reflect  the actual  population in the region.  The 6% of  Han
recorded by the 2000 census reflects only those Han whose legal place of permanent
residence is registered as within the TAR. But local officials have admitted that Lhasa
and  Shigatse,  the  TAR's  largest  cities,  have  seasonal  and  undocumented  Han
populations  of  100,000  and  50,000  respectively31,  a  number  that  approaches  the
officially  recorded  Han  population for  the  entire  TAR32.  Even  greater  statistical
anomalies exist: the total population of Bayi Township, for example, given as 16,000 in
the mid-1990s33, was reported in a government publication as 140,000 in 199734, in an
official county population of 26,000. 
23 Increased  urbanisation  is  a  key  means  by  which  the  authorities  plan  to  steer  the
economy in agricultural and pastoral areas towards marketisation and what is termed
“socio-economic  development”35.  It  is  a  goal  for  the  country  at  large36,  with
urbanisation  levels  publicly  projected  at  50% by  the  year  202037.  By  2010,  the  TAR
anticipates  urbanisation  should  rise  to  20%38,  an  expectation  facilitated  by  the
provincial Five-Year Plan's proposal to create four major urban systems in the region.
With  the  provincial  capital  Lhasa  as  the  centre  of  an  upgraded  region-wide
transportation, communications and energy network, the urban centres will provide
“effective leadership” for their surrounding areas39.  Given the overwhelmingly rural
character  of  the  TAR's  Tibetans40,  and  the  presence  of  sinicised  towns  already
constructed throughout the region41, many Tibetans infer that this aspect of the GWD is
intended to benefit migrants rather than the indigenous population. This frequently
expressed opinion is supported by extensive development of new housing estates in
Lhasa, Tsethang, Bayi and Shigatse, the TAR’s largest towns, whose construction style
reflects a Chinese architectural idiom, and whose occupants and construction workers
so far are primarily Han Chinese. Events such as the First Lhasa-Sichuan Real Estate
Expo held in Lhasa in September 200242 corroborate the impression that developing the
rental housing market, as advocated by the TAR 10th Five-Year Plan, has migrants from
populous  neighbouring  provinces  in  its  sights  as  investors  and  future  residents.
Urbanisation  disturbs  Tibetans  not  as  a  phenomenon  as  such,  but  because  of  the
expected accompanying acceleration of population influx from interior China. 
24 The level of in-migration implicit in GWD plans for the TAR represents a departure, at
least in scale, from pre-reform Tibet policy. Many Tibetans educated within the Chinese
system are aware that Chinese leaders including Mao and Deng saw Tibet as a potential
destination for millions of Chinese settlers, but immigration did not begin on a large
scale until 1992, when restrictions on private travel by PRC citizens were removed and
economic migrants entered the region in unprecedented numbers43. The process has
been escalating ever since, as recommended during the Third Tibet Work Forum, and is
intended to intensify further under the GWD. While “immigration” is never explicitly
mentioned in the TAR 10th Five-Year Plan,  and while Tibetans are included among
beneficiaries of economic progress, the model for constructing the future focuses on
human resources that the TAR cannot provide. Economic migrants are not the experts
Merging Tibetan Culture into the Chinese Economic Fast Lane
China Perspectives, 50 | november- december 2003
6
encouraged to come to the TAR in official policy, but they do provide the main labour
force for the GWD’s market, construction, and resource extraction requirements, and
are overwhelmingly Han Chinese. In official parlance, they comprise the “people of all
nationalities” in Tibet, whose cultural concepts are not among those that stand in the
way  of  market  development  like  those  of  Tibetans44,  and  whose  presence  will
contribute to “improving the quality of the population”45, assist economic acceleration,
and  guarantee  a  stable  social  order46.  The  ethnocentric  discourse  of  economic
development underpins the GWD's more practically applied measures. 
25 Urbanisation and migration have been implemented successfully, from the state’s point
of  view,  in  Inner  Mongolia  and  Xinjiang,  where  a  Han  demographic  now  nearly
dominates47.  The  unstated  doctrine  of  great  Han  agriculturalism48,  whose  forces
demographically and culturally transformed vast non-Han areas in the historical past
and  sometimes  into  the  present,  could  be  considered  as  morphing  into  great  Han
urbanisation  under  current  policies.  Han  who  have  migrated,  temporarily  or
permanently, to the TAR to date stay largely in urban environments which also, to date,
duplicate  the  essentials  of  inner  Chinese  urban  settlements,  recent  official
endorsement  for  “stressing  individual  characteristics”  in  town  construction
notwithstanding49. But increased urbanisation plans for the TAR aim to accommodate
not  only  Han migrants,  even though these  may well  constitute  the  majority  urban
population in the future, as current trends suggest. Rural Tibetans are also expected to
move to urban centres, according to state and provincial-level policy statements on
projected  socio-economic  processes.  Measures  adopted  to  facilitate  them  such  as
reform  of  household  registration50 and  envisaged  administrative  changes  whereby
prefectures  and  counties  will  be  “upgraded”  to  municipal  status51 substantiate  the
impression that deep structural alterations to society are intended along lines familiar
to the Han Chinese cultural landscape. Policy and ideational discourse link urbanisation
with developing a  modern,  civilised society,  whose features  will  then contribute  to
social  stability,  and  its  supposed  attendant  guarantee  of  national  stability.  For  the
Chinese  state,  migration  and  urbanisation  mean  creating  an  environment  in
unintegrated border regions like the TAR in which Chinese cultural characteristics will
flourish, and in so doing propel the goals of the GWD. Studies elsewhere in China’s
national minority districts have shown that it is not Han Chinese migrants who find
themselves under pressure to adapt to local culture and customs. As the social  and
political representatives of a dominant national majority, the expectation of past and
present policies involving migration is that they will influence and change the society
into  which  they  move52.  The  GWD’s  rhetoric  offers  the  current  form  of  political
legitimisation  for  social  change  via  demographic  restructuring;  the  latest  phase  of
China’s civilising, integrating project in its non-Han areas.
26 Tibetans embrace the notion of economic development, but within a Tibetan milieu.
The interlinkage between demographics, economics and politics is obvious to them. In
the creeping sinicisation of the Tibetan autonomous prefectures of Qinghai, Sichuan,
Gansu and Yunnan53, Tibetans in the TAR have ample evidence of the cultural dilution
and  marginalisation  that  occur  under  heavy  Chinese  immigration.  Although  the
negative  effects  of  immigration  are  denied  by  Party  leaders54,  Tibetans  themselves
dread  the  impact  of  large  numbers  of  immigrants  on  their culture:  privately  they
express  this  concern  more  than  any  other.  While  many  embrace  the  principles  of
education and technical advance inherent in the notion of modernisation, they see the
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effects of GWD cultural policy not in policy terms as “civilising”55, but as a means by
which Tibetan culture will be degraded and subsumed.
Religion
27 In June 2000, Li Dezhu identified the religious factor in self-identity and culture among
the  national  minorities  of  the  western  regions  as  a  prime  obstacle  to  the  smooth
implementation of the GWD: “Historically, the western region was a sensitive region for
ethnic relations. The negative impacts of some ethnic relations problems left over by
history cannot be eliminated in the short term, but still require long-term effort. The
religious  influence  of  the  western  regions  is  far‑reaching,  and  the  complexity  of
managing ethnic relations has been increased by the intermingling of nationality and
religious issues”56.
28 The  nexus  of  religion,  social  culture  and  nationality  issues  addressed  in  policy
statements  and  ideational  expositions  of  the  GWD  recognises  that  precisely  such
problems  are  expected  in  the  Tibetan  environment,  and  they  are  frequently  cited
directly  as  “separatism”.  In  the  TAR,  where  Tibetans  embrace  Buddhism  virtually
universally,  the  state  views  the  merging  of  separatism  and  religion  as  inimical  to
national  unity  and stability.  Anti-separatist  policies  linking religion with threats  to
state  security  and  development,  built  into  the  GWD  to  support  the  objectives  of
national unity and stability, are expanded to more specific measures within TAR policy.
The  Fourth  Tibet  Work  Forum  and  the  TAR  10th  Five-Year  Plan  have  adopted  an
assertive rather than reactive strategy in dealing with Tibetan separatism, described as
moving from “basic security” to “long-term security”57. This progression entails strong
anti-Dalai  Lama  rhetoric,  continuation  of  existing  “strike  hard”  and  “patriotic
education” campaigns, and more rigorous Party management of religious personnel,
activities and institutions58. 
29 Paradoxically, Tibetan culture and Chinese state ideology both link religion to national
identity, the foundation on which their conflict rests. The state calls for religion and
patriotism towards China to  be intertwined,  a  condition that  did not  apply in  pre-
modern Tibet  even when Qing  emperors  regarded Tibetan territory  as  an  imperial
protectorate. National party leaders from Jiang Zemin at the Fourth Tibet Work Forum
to Li Dezhu in his strategic paper have directed that culture, inseparable from religion
in  Tibetan  societies,  must  become  supportive  of  Chinese  ideological,  political,  and
developmental objectives. Li Dezhu refers to development as a “cause”, consistent with
its  political  characterisation.  TAR  policy  correspondingly  construes  the  religious
element in Tibetan culture in strategic terms, with a main battlefield, a target in the
form of religious influence, and a goal of reducing the “negative effects of religion on
the region's  development and stability”59.  It  names the Dalai  Lama as a  malefactor,
destructive not only to national unity but also to Tibetan Buddhism itself60, a portrayal
deeply resented by Tibetans. Such official statements, which bind the goal of “building
socialist spiritual civilisation” with the anti-separatist struggle and religion's negative
influence,  implicate  religion and its  management  by the  state  in  the  wider  goal  of
nation-building  through  social  re-engineering,  a  process  to  be  effected  both  from
within religious circles and society at large61. As major provincial-level communiqués
show,  two  years  after  adoption  of  the  GWD  the  objective  of  controlling  religious
practice, institutions and personnel, including at the highest esoteric levels of religious
leadership, remains a continuing priority62. The state's call for religion to serve state
ideology  and  development  plans  strikes  many  Tibetans  as  inconsistent  with  their
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religious convictions, a conflict which they fear will hasten a future for their region
which is decreasingly “Tibetan”.
The economic future
30 The PRC’s economic development agenda in the TAR builds on post-reform era factors
implemented through successive Tibet Work Fora, namely increased demographic and
economic  links  with  inner  China,  local  resource  exploitation,  and  infrastructural
construction. Within the provisions of the GWD, all are expanded and accelerated by
“leap-style  development”63.  The theme of  “speeding up” fits  into the wider current
discourse  on  style  of  development  for  national  minority  areas,  in  order  to  build
equality  with  China’s  richer  eastern  provinces64.  Zhu  Rongji  delivered  the  key
statement  at  the  Fourth  Tibet  Work  Forum  in  2001  on  economic  acceleration,
identifying a “weak infrastructure” as the “main factor restricting economic progress
in  Tibet”,  and  calling  for  construction  projects  in  every  key  sector,  improved
exploitation  of  resources  for  industrial  use,  comprehensive  readjustment  of  the
agricultural and pastoral industries, heightened emphasis on tourism, and infusing the
entire  development  process  with  improved  science  and  technology65.  By  promising
extensive preferential policies and generous state funding in all these areas, as well as
for  “political  power  at  the  grass-roots  levels”,  Zhu  left  no  doubt  of  the  central
government  commitment  to  build  the  TAR's  future  within  a  primarily  national
framework. 
31 Central funding and emphasis on infrastructural mechanisms to promote integration
within the nation-state have characterised Tibet policy since the 1950s,  and remain
crucial to the form of the TAR's development. The level of state funding in the TAR
under the 10th Five-Year Plan highlights state commitment, a situation not necessarily
paralleled  in  other  provinces  subject  to  the  GWD:  the  37.9  billion  yuan  originally
announced in August 200166 was increased to 90 billion yuan in 200267. To this may be
added 26.2 billion yuan for construction of the Qinghai-Tibet Railway, an extraordinary
engineering  project  decided,  financed  and  executed  by  the  state  in  pursuit  of  its
national strategic interests68. Authorities expect its impact to be “far-reaching (...) in
political,  economic  and  military  terms”69,  a  likelihood  borne  out  by  historical
precedents  of  railway-building  elsewhere  such  as  the  American  West  or  Siberia.
Integration of the TAR's economy into the national market is expected to transform the
TAR from a marginal, backward economic position into a modern market-driven entity,
in which the “people of all nationalities” contribute and share. 
32 This reference to the TAR’s multi-ethnic demographic (five times) is perhaps the most
salient  disclosure  in  the  Plan's  instructions  on  the  future  for  the  TAR,  given  the
previous  absence  there  of  any  significant  numbers  of  any  nationality  other  than
Tibetan. Many provisions relating to economic development make sense only in the
context of a significant influx of migrants:  increased urbanisation,  industrialisation,
social security measures, trade along communications routes, expanded consumerism,
resource  exploitation,  entrepreneurial  links  with  interior  provinces.  The  scale  and
nature  of  these  goals  could  not  readily  be  equated  with  either  the  size  or  the
composition of the TAR’s current population as it appears in the official portrayal: 2.62
million people in a 1.2 million square-kilometre area (population density 2.2), 80% rural
(85% for ethnic Tibetans)70,  a 32.5% illiteracy rate71,  and actual purchasing power of
rural incomes lower than for the early 1990s72.
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33 From the Tibetan perspective, the GWD's commitment that the entire nation will be
engaged in the TAR's economic development suggests a future in which Tibetans do not
play a significant role on their own terms. The TAR 10th Five-Year Plan describes the
goals  and  methods  of  development  to  be  implemented  in  the  TAR  within  the
framework of the national GWD project, but these are not tailored to local culture. Nor
are  mandates  negotiable:  potential  alternative  development  models  are  not
acknowledged73.  The  state-subsidised  exploitation  of  Tibetan  resources  to  meet
domestic  demand  is  aimed  primarily  at  supporting  Chinese  industry,  not  Tibetan
sustainable development, a situation recognised as a problem even by Hu Angang, one
of  the chief  intellectual  advocates  of  the GWD74.  Though increasingly opened up to
private  investors,  resource  extraction  is  still  governed  by  the  constitutional
appropriation of all  natural  resources by the state75,  and removes valuable regional
assets to the greater benefit of the interior than the region itself. Tibetans may covertly
complain of this process but it is generally too sensitive a subject for public airing, open
to interpretation as a colonial dynamic and ultimately an issue of nationalism76.
34 Given the divergent assessments of many local Tibetans and official discourse on the
likely impact of the GWD project, what evidence emerges so far to support either view?
The TAR Government Work Report for its last five years in office, delivered in January
2003, recognised limitations, thus far, of moving towards most of the project’s goals, by
admitting  briefly  but  frankly:  “Economic  restructuring  proceeds  slowly,  and  the
advantages  of  the  industries  with  their  own  characteristics  have  yet  to  be  fully
developed;  development  of  the  industrialised  operation  of  agriculture  and  animal
husbandry  remains  slow,  and  the  channels  for  peasants  and  herdsmen to  increase
income  are  not  wide  enough,  early  preparations  for  projects  lag  behind,  and  the
experience in the construction and management of major projects is lacking; the social
security system is still imperfect, and the employment situation is not optimistic; there
is still a gap in the implementation of various preferential policies, and the investment
climate needs to be further improved; the number of trained personnel is not enough,
and their structure irrational; some departments and localities lack creativity in doing
work, and the work style of the contingents of cadres still needs to be strengthened;
and the tasks to oppose separatism and safeguard social stability remain very difficult”.
35 Simultaneous  with  this  picture,  reported  statistics  show  a  10.9%  growth  rate  for
1998-200277, a speed attributed by a senior TAR Government leader to construction of
key projects with investment from the central government78. But urban incomes (7,119
yuan) are five times higher than rural (1,404 yuan), which are the lowest in the PRC and
apply to 85% of the TAR’s population. Although provincial leaders express awareness of
the troubling urban-rural divide and the marginalisation from socio-economic benefits
this implies for the majority of the Tibetan population, signs do not exist as yet that the
state will not privilege its own priorities over such local concerns. 
36 Not  only  do  local  preferences  or  expectations  have  no  inherent  status  against  the
state's developmental determinations as expressed in policy and its supporting laws79,
but the particularities of economic development under the GWD carry implicit Chinese
cultural norms which may undermine Tibetan practices in fundamental ways. Tibetan
culture,  especially  through  the  tourist  industry80,  should  become  an  industrialised
commodity  adapted to  the  needs  of  the  socialist  market  economy.  Agriculture  and
pastoralism,  the  economic  mainstays  for  the  majority  of  Tibetans  in  the  past  and
present,  will  face  reconfiguration  and  recontextualisation  by  changes  in  regional
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market dynamics over which farmers and herders themselves will have virtually no
control.  The  settlement  of  nomadic  pastoralists81,  sometimes  compulsory  and
sometimes unavoidable, implemented in varying degrees in the TAR since before the
Great Leap Forward82 and currently promoted under the provincial Plan83, particularly
concerns  Tibetans,  for  whom this  way of  life  has  embodied cherished cultural  and
ecological  values84.  Precedents  for  sweeping  alteration  of  pastoral  production  and
culture already exist elsewhere in the PRC, notably the Inner Mongolia Autonomous
Region,  where  pastoralism  now  symbolises  a  romanticised  embodiment  of  Mongol
identity, but is engaged in by relatively few Mongols85.
Law
37 The PRC’s  development  plans  for  the  TAR rest  on constitutional  provisions  and an
emerging grid of laws that will  ensure a top-down implementation of the GWD and
ensure  the  process  will  not  be  disrupted  by  grass-roots  complaints.  The  main
determinants of the legal environment in which the GWD will be implemented in the
TAR are:
• (a) a Law on Regional National Autonomy that requires governments of nominally
autonomous areas to follow instructions from higher levels of government and hasten to
fulfil policy directives (Article 7)86;
• (b) local legal reforms that will be carried out so the state has the unimpeded right to carry
out its policies, but without provision for citizens to object;
• (c) the national Constitution, which forbids any act the state deems not to be in its
“interests” (Article 54).
38 Perhaps ironically, government assertions that legal mechanisms and safeguards will
be developed in tandem with the GWD are not intended to protect citizens,  nor to
ensure the individual’s right to seek judicial review of policy or implementation, but to
guarantee the state's right to exert its prerogative to transfigure national minorities
and their homelands. Some PRC legal scholars critiqued the revised Law on Regional
National Autonomy, adopted in February 2001, as insufficiently attentive to the legal
relationship between organs of higher authority and those in the autonomous units87.
But by codifying the plan in a legalistic framework, the PRC can claim that the GWD is
being implemented under “rule of law”: “At the same time, we must actively provide
assistance to all levels of judicial departments for the prompt introduction of rules and
regulations and promulgation of superior policies for the minority nationalities and
ethnic regions during large‑scale western development. They must use legal methods
to provide legal  guarantees  for  the implementation of  these policies  and safeguard
implementation  of  the  strategy  of  large‑scale  western  development  with  laws  and
regulations”88.
39 The position is echoed at provincial level in the TAR 10th Five-Year Year Plan: “Local
law-making must be expanded, with emphasis on formulating a body of local laws and
regulations compatible with the socialist market economy”... “We must intensify law
enforcement and raise the standard of law enforcement in order to create a sound legal
environment for our region's participation in the development of the western region
and for preserving social stability”89.
40 The February 2001 revisions to the 1984 Law on Regional  National  Autonomy were
passed by the NPC just one year after the announcement of the GWD project. This was
hardly a coincidence: according to a vice-director of the Standing Committee of the
NPC,  the  revisions  were  intended  to  facilitate  implementation  of  the  project’s
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requirements in national minority regions90. Revisions to the Law show a discernible
shift of emphasis from protection of local socio-cultural and economic interests to a
goal of “solving problems” with respect to nationality solidarity91. While many clauses
in the revised Law give organs of self-government the right—indeed the responsibility
—to organise and develop various types of social, cultural and economic undertakings,
the framework in which these are enacted is set by the state. Language in the revised
Law echoes  the  essential  policy  formulations  of  the  GWD:  integration  and  socialist
modernisation, resolving the ethnic issue, developing the socialist market economy,
safeguarding the national unity, and so on92, describing more what is required of TAR
officials and ordinary citizens than what they may aim for themselves. Even as stated
formulations of policy and law are designated as “autonomy”, actual practice takes the
TAR towards integration. 
41 Local  culture,  politicised  in  national  minority  regions  as  backward,  potentially
dangerous and obstructive to most of the state’s aims in GWD as already discussed,
carries especial  difficulties in the TAR because of  its  religious component,  and that
component’s  association  with  a  non-Chinese  national  identity.  Nationwide  legal
restrictions  on  religious  practice  are  enforced  there  with  greater  frequency  and
sometimes ferocity than is generally the case in the Chinese demographic heartland,
and  policy  statements  issued  in  relation  to  the  GWD  make  clear  the  continuing
commitment to pervasive legal controls. Renewed political dissent that has erupted in
the TAR since the late 1980s, characterised in terms of Tibetan nationalism by both
sides, has incurred severe legal penalties under State Security and PRC Criminal Law, as
well  as political campaigns targeting aspects of religious practice and expression as
subversive to national security. Many sections in current state and provincial policy,
inclusive of  the GWD, emphasise official  intolerance of  religious culture which falls
outside Party-established norms93.
42 The  PRC  government  believes  that  through  the  GWD  it  will  ensure  stability  and
prosperity  in  the  western  regions.  Through the  Constitution  and  the  politico-legal
apparatus they exercise a statutory right to rule Tibetans as citizens of the Chinese
motherland.  Laws  have  been  created  specifically  to  facilitate  and  validate  central
control. An expectation of ethnic conflicts and separatist sentiments, sometimes coded
in terms such as “contradictions among the people in the new period”94 or  overtly
signified in measures for increased security forces in the border areas,  informs the
legal support system for implementing the GWD, as language in policy and law guides
the national minority areas alike along a state-directed path of socialist modernisation
and national integration. 
Solving the nationalities' problem
43 In framing the future of the TAR—a nominally autonomous region with a history of
separate  self-identity—within  a  context  of  national  security  and  stability,  the  GWD
acknowledges  the  underlying  political  contestation  between  the  state  and  many
Tibetans.  This  political  element,  underpinned  by  the  TAR's  original  demographic
homogeneity and isolation from any centres of Chinese population and culture, makes
implementation of the project there locally significant less in economic than in cultural
terms.  The  GWD,  in  its  cultural  policy,  appears  to  be  pursuing  parallel  agendas—
integration and rhetorical adherence to cultural diversity—which nevertheless stream
towards the ultimate goal of national unity. Though both are claimed to be integral to
the GWD, in some regions—certainly the TAR—an innate conflict exists in promoting
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these stated aims. While recognising the multi-ethnic nature of the Chinese state, the
state  authorities  intend  to  manage  multiculturalism  in  ways  that  will,  they  hope,
ensure it does not hinder wider developmental and strategic objectives. 
44 Preferred  methodology  for  meeting  goals,  and  the  preferential  term  for  these,  is
“development”, for which an all-encompassing power is identified. “Development is the
last word” in facilitating the GWD95, “the foundation for settling all the issues of Tibet”
96, and ideationally the “infallible truth” for creating “stability in the new era”97. Yet
“development” both serves and defines an over-arching state-building, assimilationist
project; a project with colonialist processes. Amidst the developmental paradigm, the
question  of  safeguarding  autonomy  in  regions  thus  designated  does  not  arise.  The
Centre can develop the TAR regardless of its nominal autonomy, since this status grants
the right to participate in national projects of development and unification, not the
right of abstinence. Implications in some provincial-level releases that local needs are
not being met suggest that the national GWD project, like state policy affecting the TAR
in the past, seems prepared principally to address its own mandates there. 
45 Solving the nationalities problem, as one of them, cannot but have essentialist cultural
overtones in a region whose indigenous culture exhibits persistent tendencies towards
non-integration.  The  state  anticipates  that  its  project  will  likely  provoke  deep
objections  in  the  TAR,  and  requires  that  opposition  be  “handled  properly  and
promptly”  before  it  can  “affect  national  unity  and  social  stability”98.  At  state  and
provincial  levels,  authorities  are  suggesting  that  Tibetan  opposition  would  not  be
rooted in grass-roots rejection of Chinese developmental models, but in the inherent
weakness of Tibetan culture, as well as outside interference. Whatever its source, there
will be no hesitation in using powerful means to counter dissent or resistance. Policy
and law supportively ensure the “smooth implementation of the strategy of large-scale
western development”99. In its reliance on increased immigration from interior China,
economic  development  accelerated  by  state-mandated  policies  and  investment,  the
merging of  TAR markets  into  the  national  mainstream,  and open calls  for  cultural
assimilation, the GWD’s implementation will rely on measures introduced to Tibetans
during earlier chapters of policy for their region. The project’s terms provide merely
the latest reference point for carrying these measures out, while high levels of funding
underscore the state's determination to realise current policy proposals for the TAR.
Among these, an altered demographic base and stronger political integration into the
Chinese state seem likely to be deliverable. Future assessments of the PRC's success in
“solving  the  nationalities'  problem”  in  Tibet  will  call  for  an  examination  of  the
applicability of the term “Tibetan” to the prevailing culture of the region’s inhabitants.
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